The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam

October 13, 2014

Saturday’s (11 October) New York Times carried an article on The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. For anyone familiar with China, the name rings familiar: what China’s government is striving to achieve is officially called “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people”, but a better translation of Zhonghua minzu de weida fuxing is in fact “the grand renaissance of the Chinese race/nation”. The article describes forced wage deductions from workers to buy bonds supporting the cost of the dam and says reactions are mixed: some are unhappy while others seem enthused by the hope of development.

The article mentions that the dam will partly be built with a Chinese loan, but by an Italian company, Salini (thanks to Paulette Nonfodji for pointing this out). This is unusual and makes me wonder why the Chinese government agreed to provide the loan without the usual requirement for procurement in China. Perhaps there are Chinese subcontractors or perhaps the Ethiopian government has pushed back. In any case, this is something of a corrective to the excessive focus on the role of China in controversial development projects in Africa, making  it seem as though China deliberately exports predatory development just to pursue its own ends. In fact, an increasing number of Western, Brazilian, Russian, Korean and other companies are rejoining the ranks of global dam builders now that there is financing to be had from the World Bank and elsewhere, and the projects are beginning to look commercially viable.

For some time, various observers of China’s overseas engagements, including myself, have thought that if there was one country that could be said to be emulating the “Chinese model”, that’s Ethiopia: a strong developmental state that suppresses opposition, engages in surveillance and media censorship, and uses extralegal coercion when wanting to advance its goals. Perhaps it also produces the type of nationalist-developmentalist discourse that China does, and perhaps it is just as effective. Of course, there is nothing “Chinese” about this in any cultural sense: other developmental states like South Korea have done this in the past. But then again, perhaps there aren’t that many similar examples either. And it is certainly China’s example, and Chinese investment capital, that help the propagation of this approach now rather than in the 1970s. Yet, as this case shows, attracting Chinese capital may involve displays of friendliness towards China (and of annoyance towards Western human rights concerns) but does not need to result in a weaker hand when it comes to balancing Chinese and other interests.

We shall see to what extent other governments adopt this approach and how far they get with it. There is no want of candidates: Egypt, Turkey, Russia, Hungary, and some South American states come to mind. Interestingly, African states less so.

Guest post: Are China’s NGOs entering Africa?

June 30, 2014

In April this year, two groups of Chinese journalists visited East Africa on a reporting trip. This post is translated from an unpublished article written by one of them, Hu Jianlong 胡剑龙, a senior investigative reporter for Southern Weekly. The author is a 2013 alumnus of Wits University’s China-Africa Reporting Project. He is currently cooperating with a Malagasy reporter on an article on illegal logging in Madagascar, and is planning to return to Uganda and Kenya in July. He can be contacted at nfrbhjl AT

In the evening of 18 May, the Africa Philanthropy Forum, held at a congress hall near the Lingshan Buddha — East China’s largest Buddha statue – experienced another small climax. Gu Xiulian, a former deputy chairwoman of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, and Ethiopia’s first lady jointly held up a vermilion tablet with “10 million yuan” written on it. The former represented the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation (CFPA), which pledged 10 million yuan to the “Smiling Children” pilot project in Ethiopia, to be implemented in the next five years jointly with the First Lady’s Office. When the first lady gave her words of thanks — before the cameras captured the two ladies’ smiles – she became so emotional she could hardly speak.

The scene seemed typical of China-Africa relations. A week earlier, on his first visit to Africa, Premier Li Keqiang arrived in one capital after the other waving a cheque in support of our African brothers. And at the negotiating tables, he signed the most generous infrastructure investment agreements to date.

At the Africa Philanthropy Forum on the banks of Lake Tai, CFPA’s executive chairman, He Daofeng, announced this star NGO’s strategy to enter Africa in a stirring speech. Picking up the forum’s theme, “People Helping People,” He explained that China’s traditional foreign aid strategy has relied on government-to-government cooperation — what he termed the “G2G” model. It was time, he said, to infuse the process with new perspectives and forces to be gained from “P2P” (people-to-people) cooperation.

Although He spoke only in CFPA’s name and did not provide a timetable, African attendees eagerly embraced the prospect of NGOs coming from China. “What’s next?” — asked Susan Tiisa Mugwanya, in charge of culture and education at the Ugandan Embassy in Beijing.

CFPA has no clear plan for Uganda. Mugwanya is unlikely to have been satisfied by the Chinese host’s vague answer. Still, the Ugandans have reasons to be pleased. In April 2014, Western NGOs in Kampala were vocal in criticising the Ugandan government’s draft of a law criminalising homosexuality law. According to Reuters, the minister of internal affairs warned them that they had no right to interfere with Uganda’s domestic matters. Officials in many African countries have grown tired of Western NGOs. The arrival of the Chinese promises more choices and generates excitement.

After the first Chinese appeared in Zambia’s Copperbelt and in Congo’s jungles a few years ago, others were quick to jump on the bandwagon. Now, many are joining the effort to build civil society in Africa. Once the door has been opened, some Chinese NGOs are actively pursuing a “going out” strategy; others go along with the Ministry of Commerce’s (MofCom’s) pressure to join in its pilot project to develop a new modality in China’s foreign development assistance. Together, they represent a diverse range of activities.

This spring, a friend visited the official in charge of MofCom’s foreign aid department. The official recited a series of old clichés: “Through all these years, our aid has been quite successful. Just think of the Tazara railway.” Recounting this official’s words with an expression of distaste, my friend pointed out: “After all these years, their favourite success story is still Tazara,” completed in 1976. “How pitiful is that! These people,” he continued, referring to the makers and shapers of China’s foreign aid policy, “still live in Mao’s shadow, but they don’t have Mao’s guts to get something like Tazara done.”

This sort of biting criticism is common in private conversations. But the Foreign Ministry and the Communist Party’s International Department, MofCom’s competitors on the foreign aid front, often criticise the latter for similar reasons. Since 2008, such voices have grown stronger. After Premier Wen Jiabao announced his 4 trillion yuan stimulus plan for the economy, Chinese companies, not used to being mobile, began scrambling for opportunities everywhere. “Going out” became a business fad and a government mantra. At the same time, as personnel moved around and investment was scaled up, friction on labour, legal, and environmental issues became more visible.

Some scholars believe that MofCom’s foreign aid policy is largely driven by economic considerations, and its complementarity with the goals of Chinese diplomacy is limited. The continuing damage to China’s interests and international image in Africa cannot all be attributed to the incompetence of MofCom or Foreign Ministry officials or the failure of foreign aid policy. But as early as in 2009, high-level decision makers were planning to tackle these problems.

In February 2009, then State Council Chairman Hu Jintao, during his visit to four African countries, pledged to “enthusiastically support African countries’ development and improvement of livelihoods.” Since then, “African people’s livelihoods” has become mainstream language in the ideological framing of China-Africa relations by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials. In particular, it surfaced extensively in quotes from official experts in Xinhua News Agency’s feel-good propaganda pieces ahead of Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to Africa in May this year.

Li Keqiang inherited this language from the previous government and expanded upon it. In Angola, he discussed “people’s livelihoods” at a roundtable with representatives of Chinese enterprises and other Chinese citizens resident in the country, the first time this issue was made the subject of discussion during a top official’s visit abroad. This signals that China is in the process of revising the way of providing foreign aid it has employed for many years – one for which the Tazara railway stood in Mao’s time, and countless government buildings and megastadiums in the first thirty years of the post-Mao era.

In government parlance, all these are called “turnkey projects”. The White Paper on Foreign Aid, published in April 2011, lists them in first place among eight types of foreign aid. More precisely, such projects can be described as industrial and civil engineering projects financed by aid grants and interest-free loans from China.

As “people’s livelihood projects” become more mainstream in the future, “turnkey projects” may become more marginal. Facing such pressure, MofCom, too, has come up with “new thinking.” “Grassroots organisations participating in foreign aid” has become part of the reform agenda. So far, this policy has not been made public. It is hard to say when the proposal arrived on the desk of the minister of commerce, but it must have been pushed by open-minded officials within the CCP system.

At a “going out” forum organised by the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade in April this year, a businessman from Fujian made a candid speech. His company is present throughout Africa and has been rather successful. Facing the microphone, he called on Chinese NGOs to go to Africa now. In his view, this was essential for improving the operating environment.

In late 2013, I visited China’s ambassador in Lusaka, Zhou Yuxiao. He has rich foreign service experience in Africa and, unlike traditional Chinese diplomats, often leaves his official compound to talk to Zambians from all walks of life. Ambassador Zhou observed that, in the past years, Western aid for Africa has increasingly been channelled through NGOs. Indeed, as the Zambian scholar Dambisa Moyo noted in Dead Aid and William Easterly in The Tyranny of Experts, the government-to-government aid model led by the World Bank and Western development agencies is long since bankrupt in Africa.

Some of MofCom’s experienced officials, too, have realised that they need players from outside the government apparatus to rescue foreign aid from anomie. Some Chinese NGOs have flagged their willingness to participate in foreign aid to MofCom’s top leadership. The ministry is said to have agreed in principle to allocate some of its foreign aid budget to procuring services from NGOs.

This comes against a background of rapid growth in Chinese philanthropy and civil society. In 2013, the Chinese government spent 15 bn yuan on service-delivery contracts with social organisations domestically. Applying a similar model to foreign aid would not challenge the red lines of government policy.

Still, it is unclear when it will get a green light. According to an NGO delegate at the Africa Philanthropy Forum, talk of pilot projects financed by MofCom started last year, but it was still uncertain whether the pilots could begin in 2014.

Resistance to the initiative may be coming less from the bureaucracy than from public opinion. On the Chinese Internet and social media platforms, foreign aid tends to be discussed with vitriolic sarcasm and creative teasing. Although China’s foreign aid volumes are far smaller than people tend to think, when the news of Premier Li’s African visit was publicised on Sina Weibo – China’s equivalent of Twitter – most reactions questioned why Chinese taxpayers’ hard-earned money had to be squandered in Africa.

The policy is hard for the government to justify. In April this year, the World Bank released a report claiming that, at purchasing power parity, China’s economy has already overtaken the U.S. to become the world’s largest. But according to Western media, China refused to accept the “number one” label and pressured the World Bank for a full year to embargo the report.

The Chinese government has gone to great lengths to protect its precarious hold on developing country status. Historically, foreign aid has flown from developed to developing countries. Developing countries aiding developing countries is a rare occurrence. It is easy for people to question China’s behaviour: if it is a developing country, why assume a responsibility that does not match its economic standing?

The controversy around foreign aid has also to do with the structure of Chinese society. An enormous gap between rich and poor means that a sizeable proportion of citizens experience relative deprivation. They are unlikely to have travelled abroad, and the ideals of world citizenship are largely absent from China’s education system. Thus, they tend to see foreign aid as taking from the family to support an illicit passion outside, and use the topic to vent their frustrations online.

Such storms in cyberspace may be irrational and bear no relation to facts, but they are a source of heavy pressure on the authorities. On 3 August 2011, a Chinese businessman donated 1.5 bn yuan to the China Youth Development Foundation (CYDF) to build one thousand “China-Africa Hope Schools” in Africa. Later, this businessman was mentioned in a number of negative news reports, raising doubts about the project, and by implication about the foundation’s involvement. This set back CYDF’s originally ambitious African plans. “There were no problems with the project itself, only with our partner,” a foundation official told me wistfully. “Now we don’t even dare mention Africa any more.”

Foreign aid has also become a sensitive, even risky, topic for government officials. When this reporter tried to raise it with a deputy head of MofCom’s West Asia and Africa department at the Africa Philanthropy Forum on 18 May, the official waved him away with the words “This issue is too sensitive.”

As for NGOs, the biggest obstacle in entering Africa may be the limits of their own capacity. Although Chinese NGOs have been expanding rapidly in the last few years, organisations with a truly international presence have yet to appear. Whether their management experience and human resources are up to the task is a consideration that has played into MofCom’s slowness to launch a pilot project. A MofCom official said they were struggling with a number of unsolved questions such as what standards to apply to service contracts and how to select NGO partners.

Even so, the ministry and the NGOs stand at the gates of Africa, ready to risk drowning in the spittle of online vitiation.

Sixty years ago, loud and obnoxious American tourists were the butt of scorn around the world. In 1958, Eugene Burdick and William Lederer published The Ugly American, marking the beginning of a wave of criticism of American foreign policy by the public. The book played a part in the U.S. government’s decision to establish Peace Corps, an organisation charged with delivering part of foreign aid by dispatching volunteers to poor regions of the world. Politicians hoped Peace Corps would help improve Americans’ image abroad while helping young Americans, including many future diplomats, develop a deeper understanding of the world.

Sixty years later, a rising China faces a similar difficulty. In April, the Ethnics Institute of South Africa released the results of a survey of African executives on the impact of Chinese business in Africa. The survey was administered to senior managers with extensive business contacts with China in fifteen African countries. Regarding the overall reputation of Chinese companies, responses were more or less balanced: 43.3% of respondents viewed them negatively, 35.4% positively. But 55.9% held a negative view of goods and services provided by Chinese companies, compared to 22.7% who held a positive view. The worst perception was associated with Chinese companies’ sense of responsibility: only 11.1% believed they cared about environmental protection, while 53.9% said they did not. 21 and 28.3% respectively held a positive view of Chinese companies’ sense of social and economic responsibility. Respondents were similarly negative regarding Chinese companies’ employment practices. (See my earlier report on Chinese companies in Zambia here.)

Damage to China’s international reputation and such generalised antagonism drives up the costs of getting across to and doing business with the world. To some extent, China’s NGOs, despite their weakness, may be able to play the mitigating role of the Peace Corps. Among my interlocutors in China’s brave NGO world, the general sentiment is that the obstacles awaiting them in Africa are not important: what matters is that “the Chinese are coming.” Not the exploitative Chinese managers depicted in the BBC’s eponymous documentary, but a bunch of Chinese wanting to do good.

Chinese premier says China will establish environmental institute in Kenya

May 28, 2014

Among the pledges made by Chinese premier Li Keqiang at the African Union meeting in Addis Abeba on 5 May, increasing the credit line to African countries to $30bn by adding another $10bn was probably the one attracting the most headlines. (The full text of Li’s speech has been widely circulated in Chinese media, for example here.) Such promises, however, have been very hard to track. Some of the details of Li’s propositions were more interesting. To begin with, he talked about the “strategic complementarity” (战略对接) of Chinese and African industries in the context of helping localise labour-intensive garment and electronics manufacturing in Africa. This has, of course, long been talked about, but the phrasing is perhaps more explicit than before. Li also mentioned support for setting up a Chinese-African joint venture airline and funding a high-speed railway research centre.

For me, the most interesting proposition was setting up a “Chinese-African joint research centre” (中飞联合研究中心) devoted to biodiversity, desertification control, “demonstration of modern agriculture” and other issues and expected to help promote “clean energy” and “renewable energy.” Although this reads like nothing beyond a list of buzzwords, it has a proposed location (Kenya) and is part of a $10 million pledge for wildlife protection. Running a serious institute would of course easily eat up that budget. If this will indeed be a serious undertaking involving Chinese academics, then I am very curious about the extent to which Chinese environmentalists may be included in the initiative. Some years ago, the Peking-based Global Environmental Institute, closely related to the ministry of the environment, set up a branch in Vientiane, Laos. This has been a low-key operation, but to my knowledge, this was the first time for a Chinese research institute or a non-governmental organisation of any stripe to set up an affiliate abroad, and it has for a while recruited highly qualified young Chinese researchers, some trained in the West.

Li’s announcement of the new institute is an indication of the government’s desire to counteract the negative publicity around the issue of ivory and rhino horn poaching. (One Chinese journalist in Kenya told me that it was the only issue the Chinese ambassador felt embarrassed by.) It also fits into the strategy of “great aid” (大援外) promoted by some foreign ministry officials, meaning that foreign development assistance should involve more actors than just the government, notably the financing or even creation of NGOs (in large part to counterbalance Western dominance of the sector).

Of course, the whole affair may come to nothing, but it  may also conceivably produce more than mere window-dressing. There is a new generation of well-trained Chinese corporate personnel abroad who are not just aware that something must be done about corporate social responsibility (CSR) but are also personally interested in “doing good.” China House, an NGO set up in Nairobi early this year by the journalist Huang Hongxiang, who does PR for a local Chinese company and runs a website devoted to “China-South dialogue,” has already attracted over a dozen young Chinese interested in volunteering or interning as part of such projects. This is a significant development that is certain to become more visible in the coming years. The question is to what extent the government-initiated institute will be interested and successful in harnessing this popular interest, and whether such individuals will be able to influence its agenda.

Urban China issue on Chinese cities in Africa

March 22, 2014

The Shanghai urban design journal Urban China, based at Tongji University, is devoting its upcoming 63rd issue to Chinese urban design in Africa. As is often the case, architects appear to be ahead of social scientists in exploring the scope and implications of Chinese companies exporting not just buildings but entire master plans. A sample of the issue, which is the result of a collaboration with the Netherlands-based Go West Project, is available for download from Douban. It includes a reportage from Lekki Special Economic Zone, an article by the billionaire developer Dai Zhikang, who has vowed to build a new city centre for Johannesburg, and several Chinese architects and urban planners engaged in Africa. The lush illustrations are part of the issue’s draw.

Chinese companies contract white Zimbabwean farmers to plant tobacco

October 20, 2013

Just had an interesting conversation with a white Zimbabwean shipping manager in Harare. He told me some of the white farmers who were thrown off their farms by Mugabe in 2002 have come back and are planting tobacco under contract for Chinese companies, which provide seeds and technical support. Would be interesting to know if anyone has done any reserach on this.

New Ethiopian presient has PhD from China

October 18, 2013

As PKU African Tele-Info reports this week (issue 159), the new Ethiopian president, Mulatu Teshome, an Oromo, has a PhD in international relations from Peking University, a department best known for the assertive nationalist Yan Xuetong. This must be the first African head of state — though ceremonial — trained in China.

CWE challenges Sinohydro contract in Uganda

July 12, 2013

In recent months — spurred by the attacks on Chinese gold-diggers in Uganda — Chinese media have been reflecting on the worsening perception of Chinese investment in Africa and the responses that this might need from China.

But one of the most recent news — an article in a Ugandan newspaper about a lawsuit filed by 54 households demanding more compensation for the effects of the Karuma dam project, awarded to Sinohydro — suggests another interesting trend. In parallel to this lawsuit, CWE, another state-owned Chinese company, challenged the award of the tender to Sinhohydro. The article gives no details, but this must be one of the first instances for two large Chinese state companies to battle with each other in a foreign court. This suggests that, at least in some instances, the state’s mitigating role is fading and the companies are increasingly behaving like market actors, even risking the loss of reputation abroad.

Anbound Consulting: Africa will solve China’s problems

March 30, 2013

On 15 January, the Peking consultancy Anbound released a report that argues that a Chinese “Marshall Plan” for Africa would not only solve China’s problems of an industrial transition (by offshoring labour-intensive low-tech industries and by creating markets for outdated products) but also slow the yuan’s inflation by creating a pool of the currency in Africa.

None of the suggestions are original in themselves — nor is the recommendation for China to radically increase funding for research on Africa and exchanges with African NGOS — but Anbound proposes all this under a comprehensive ten-year, $400bn government- financed plan that would help the expansion of Chinese exports and manufacturing. The last of the 12 recommendations is facilitating family migration in both directions: in China, African migrants are to rejuvenate an aging labour force, while in Africa, Chinese are to bring capital, technology, and kn0w-how. The price label, and of course the advocacy of a comprehensive plan that includes migration, is exactly what suspicious Western critics have always feared: a grand Chinese strategy to take over Africa.

I am not sure what Anbound’s standing in China is. It is very unlikely that the government will take their advice, but I would be curious how widely shared such views are in policy circles.



Re-reading The Star Raft

October 25, 2012

Philip Snow’s The Star Raft is not often cited in today’s China-Africa literature, but it remains the most enjoyable volume in it. Snow is an engaging narrator without being superficial; his prose is erudite and unmistakably “posh” (he is the son of a peer, after all!), yet plain. He relies on a wealth of references that are nonetheless discreetly tucked away (few academics dare write in this way any more). At the same time, he has a clear sympathy for China (a very different China than that of today) that always avoids being dogmatic or breathless in the way some commentary today is. And Snow is emphatic about his “overriding concern with human exchange” (p. xvii), as much of today’s literature is not.

I am re-reading the book for a class I am co-teaching, and am struck by the prescience of the preface, written in 1987 — except on the subject of South Africa:

…[R]ight up to the mid-1970s […] observers predicted the arrival of Chinese warships in the ports of […] the East African coast. […] Today, in the late 1980s, it is difficult to remember that the alarm was once so great. […] Europe and the United States have come to regard [China] as an amiable semi-ally in their confrontation with the Soviet camp. Africa […] has not found strength or unity, and it has not been able to free itself from Western influence. Most of its states continue to be economically feeble and sustained by constant transfusions of European and American aid. […] Neither China nor Africa seems likely, in the near future, to disturb the West’s repose.

But the quiet may be misleading. […] the process of modernization in which [China] is engaged will enable it, in the end, to assert its will far more effectively […] Africa may not always be weak. The continent may look a very different place, for example, when the apartheid regime in South Africa finally collapses and is replaced by a black-ruled state, rich, powerful and equipped with the nuclear arsenal which the defeated white minority will probably leave behind. And as African countries slowly become more stable and more prosperous, their leaders can be expected to grow increasingly impatient with the continent’s unhappy state of disunity and dependence on Western funds and advice. […]

We are going to have to accept the fact that the various non-Western peoples are likely to come together with increasing frequency: that they are likely, more and more, to question the disproportionate share of the world’s decision-making power and resources which we — and the Soviet Union — continue to enjoy. […] From this point of view we shall be well advised to follow with some interest the expansion of contacts between all parts of the Third World. Will Brazil step up its growing economic role in Africa? Will the Arab states live up to the pledges they have made to use their oil wealth to give a political lead to the poorer developing countries? […]

The Third World peoples will certainly have little hope of destroying our supremacy unless they can make a success of working together — not just as governments or companies but as individuals too.

From exporting labour to exporting standards?

October 20, 2012

In the discussion of China’s export of high-speed railways in the Chinese media, there has been mention of the importance of building railways and trains to Chinese standards and specifications, as opposed to supplying them to European or American standards. In the context of the Pan-Asian Railway and the so-called Asia-Europe land bridge, a railway network designed to Chinese standards was seen as giving China control over the network itself, which could be a means of controlling, for example, flows of oil.

In a recent article, 中国商报 raised the same point from a trade perspective and linked it to what it deemed the unsustainable nature of Chinese labour exports. In Egypt, for example, the basic wage of a Chinese construction worker is over 5,000 yuan a month plus overtime. Increasingly, the wage differential compared to local labour (though, presumably, this does not hold for the higher-wage countries in Southern Africa) is so great that it that outweighs the benefits of the greater productivity of Chinese workers. Another problem, as the deputy general manager of the overseas department of China Communications Construction Company told the paper, is the “malicious and excessive rights activism” (额以威权、过度维权) of Chinese workers overseas demanding more pay — an intriguing comment considering that little of that activism gets reported not only in Western but also in Chinese media, presumably because the news do not travel outside the overseas corporate compounds.
The article notes that, currently, few overseas projects are designed by Chinese companies (which may be true in communications, but not in hydropower), and that Chinese contractors are ultimately vulnerable to the Western companies that oversee design. “Controlling the technical standards means having leadership rights in the international competition. Whoever controls the standards decides the rules.” The way forward is thus not just to get overseas EPC contracts but to be planners and designers at the level of a regional communication network. Foreign-language translations of 12 Chinese “communications construction standards” have already been published.
The nature of the telecom industry is indeed such that the whoever controls the planning of regional networks holds the trump cards for years to come, both in terms of negotiating with suppliers and strategic control. As in the case of railways, there may indeed be both commercial and — on the part of the Chinese state — geostrategic reasons for striving for such positions.