Portrait of Huang Nubo, Iceland’s Chinese conqueror

November 17, 2011

Southern Weekend has published a profile of Huang Nubo, the real estate magnate whose bid to buy a large chunk of land in Iceland to build a mega-resort has raised predictable waves and conspiracy theories about China’s government involvement (Huang has been a Propaganda Department official). The profile, translated on China Dialogue, makes for fascinating reading.

The man, it turns out, is a serious mountaineer and one of the few people who have been to both the South and the North Pole. He is almost 2m tall. His 16th-floor office has four cats, a rabbit, two monkeys and two parrots: “not the traditional office of a Chinese businessman.”

Maybe it’s just the Nordic connection, but the picture reminded me of Henning Mankell’s description of the Peking office of the evil tycoon who is the protagonist of his novel The Man from Beijing. That tycoon, connected to the highest officials in the Party, plans a mass resettlement of Chinese farmers in Africa even as he arranges for a series of revenge murders in Sweden. The Guardian called the novel “admirable in its concern about corruption, colonialism and ­cruelty.” The two businessmen are very similar: starting from officialdom, they become cosmopolitan globetrotters — Huang actually says he decided to quit government service after reading Chekhov’s Death of an Official! — but it is just this seeming cosmopolitanism that makes them such good subjects of conspiracy theories.

The Iceland venture was facilitated by the wife of an Icelandic friend Huang had met at Peking University. She later became mayor of Reykjavik and a government minister. (This detail reminded me of Dan Holloway’s short story in which a Spanish official decides the only way to save his hometown is to invite Chinese investors to build a car factory that will destroy the local landscape. The head of the Chinese delegation is a businesswoman who was Ignacio’s lover during his studies in China.)

According to the article, in 2005, Huang tried to invest in tourism development at Issyk-Kol Lake in Kyrgyzstan but withdrew after media spread the story that the project was a cover for China’s nuclear submarine programme and Kyrgyz officials began asking him for their cut. (I visited Issyk-Kol around the same time and wished there were somewhere to stay apart from Soviet-ere sanatoria.) “I got scared — you can’t go so far as to bribe people.” Then Huang tried to invest in a resort in Hokkaido but found that Japanese workers didn’t want to work for a Chinese boss or a woman.

See, he says all the right things for liberal Western readers. Suspicious, huh?

To the three c’s of corruption, colonialism and cruelty, let’s add two more: cosmopolitanism and conspiracy. All combinations allowed.

The Lumbini project: a Chinese-developed scenic spot in Nepal?

July 19, 2011

Fellow (but alas, recently dormant) MqVU blogger Zhang Juan forwarded to me a post by Al-Jazeera’s China correspondent Melissa Chan. Chan writes that

China is leading a project worth $3bn to transform the small town into the premier place of pilgrimage for Buddhists from around the world.  Little Lumbini will have an airport, highway, hotels, convention centre, temples and a Buddhist university. That’s in addition to the installation of water, electricity and communication lines it currently lacks. (…)

(T)he project is worth almost 10 per cent of the country’s GDP. (…) The organization behind the project is called the Asia Pacific Exchange and Cooperation Foundation (APECF), a quasi-governmental non-governmental organisation. Its executive vice president, Xiao Wunan (…) holds a position at the National Development and Reform Commission (…) On Friday, APECF held a signing ceremony for the project with the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). (…)

With the backing of the UN, Xiao has said he hopes Lumbini will bring together all three schools of the faith: the Mahayana as practised in China, Japan, and South Korea; the Hinayana as practiced in Southeast Asia; and Tibetan Buddhism. (…)

Lumbini will become a special development zone, similar to some of China’s successful zones such as Shenzhen, with preferential treatment, tax breaks and investment incentives.

Hu Yuandong of UNIDO, which will advise on the creation of the development zone, says the focus of the project is job creation, poverty alleviation and environmental protection.

Xiao has made clear that the $3bn investment is not coming from the Chinese government, but rather from various funds “around the world” – even from the Middle East.

Much of Chan’s post focuses on whether this project should be seen as a state-backed Chinese attempt to impose its interpretation on world Buddhism, aimed particularly to marginalize the Dalai Lama, who has not been allowed to visit Lumbini since the 1980s. (Nepal has been applying increasing pressure on Tibetan refugees, cracking down on protests several times since 2008.)

It is likely that the masterminds of the scheme are appealing to this line of thought, partly to gain support from the Chinese government. But I take this with a grain of salt: all Chinese special-zone projects, from the now-shuttered casino town at Boten in northern Laos to the East Africa Economic Development Zone and  the mega-investment in the Swedish town of Kalmar (which never materialised and was the subject of Ronja Yu’s documentary The Chinese are Coming to Town), include extravagant plans of modernization, none of which have yet materialized. Although UNIDO’s support for the zone is notable, it was also present in the case of Laos. I wouldn’t be terribly surprised if the whole thing turned out to be a bubble.

Nonetheless, the news is interesting in that it demonstrates the continuing appeal and versatility of the special zone model in China’s neighbourhood, as well as the rapidly expanding scale of Chinese tourism. As the growth of Golden Boten City, a special zone in northern Laos so far centred on gambling, ground to a halt this spring under Chinese government pressure and as its operator is likely to sell its holdings, questions have arisen about the future of the zone itself. Another gambling-centred zone in Laos, Golden Triangle, wants to reorient itself towards tourism. The Lumbini plan suggests that these plans may not be entirely unrealistic.

The Lumbini project is the first attempt to recreate China’s “scenic spot” model of tourism development abroad, targeting both Chinese and non-Chinese tourists and highlighting the entanglements of religion and tourism that characterise such developments in China. (One is reminded in particular of a recent megadevelopment in Shandong Province to create a kind of Confucius theme park centred on the sage’s birthpace.) While, to repeat, I do not think that the Chinese state is directly involved in this project as a way of squeezing the Dalai Lama, it does seem to constitute the propagation of a state-engineered sinocentric view of Buddhism beyond China’s borders, even if a market-driven one.